Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications
研究一般约束下的匹配模型，在稳定匹配通常不存在时，关注可行、个体理性且公平的匹配，通过函数不动点刻画这类匹配，并分析存在学生最优公平匹配的条件，最后用政府日托分配数据验证理论。
Abstract This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that a stable matching typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair matchings. We characterize such matchings by fixed points of a certain function. Building on this result, we characterize the class of constraints on individual schools under which there exists a student-optimal fair matching, the matching that is the most preferred by every student among those satisfying the three desirable properties. We study the numerical relevance of our theory using data on government-organized daycare allocation.