Taxation, Fiscal Redistribution, and Local Land Use Regulation
研究了财政制度如何影响地方土地使用，发现税收基础流动性促使地方政府扩大商业和住宅用地，而财政再分配会抑制这一激励。
<h3>Abstract</h3> This paper explores the role of fiscal institutions for local land use. It argues that tax-base mobility results in an incentive to expand commercial and residential land use, which is mitigated by fiscal redistribution. These predictions are investigated empirically using a dataset of German municipalities. To identify differences in the exposure to fiscal redistribution, I exploit institutional characteristics of fiscal-equalization grants using a regression-discontinuity analysis. The results support the role of fiscal incentives for local land-use regulation, as commercial and residential land use is expanded much faster, and agricultural land use declines more rapidly in municipalities exempted from fiscal redistribution.