Do bank managers signal through cash flow statements?
研究了日本银行经理是否通过将投资或融资活动的现金流转移到经营活动来缓解风险暴露担忧，发现这种行为在高风险情况下更严重，并传递了银行风险变化的信息。
Abstract We empirically examine the cash flow statements for Japanese banks and whether their managers engage in classification shifting to temper concerns about risk exposure. To create a buffer against liquidity shocks, they shift cash flows from investing and/or financing activities to operating activities. We also find robust evidence that classification shifting intensifies in higher risk situations. Although prior research on managerial discretion focuses on earning management, we are the first to show cash flow management to avoid sequential negative changes in operating cash flows. We show that these activities convey valuable information about changes in banks' risk exposure.