Auctions and Negotiations in Housing Price Dynamics
研究拍卖与谈判两种售房机制如何影响住房价格惯性，发现拍卖价格预测性更好且动量更小，并分解出买方与卖方价值，其中卖方价值更新缓慢是价格惯性的重要原因。
Abstract We shed light on housing price inertia by investigating how the home-sale mechanism affects housing price dynamics. Using Australian data, we find that auction prices forecast better and display less momentum than negotiated prices. These findings are robust to alternative price measurements and different sample selection corrections. Motivated by microtheory that predicts different weights for buyer and seller values in auction and negotiated prices, we decompose housing prices into two diffusion processes and interpret them as buyer value and seller value, respectively. The seller value updates much more slowly, which could be an important driver of housing price inertia.