Price Discrimination in Selection Markets
研究了竞争性柠檬市场中，基于信号（如年龄）的价格歧视如何影响福利，发现限制价格歧视可能提高福利，尤其在低成本市场逆向选择更严重时。
Abstract Should insurance prices vary with age? I consider competitive markets for lemons where a signal (e.g., age) partitions consumers (e.g., young and old). I study the continuum of policies from zero price discrimination (zero PD, equal prices) to full PD (no restrictions). Restricting PD can increase welfare if high-cost markets exhibit greater adverse selection, or when the high-cost market “unravels.” I characterize optimal PD and show how it is affected by changes in cost. In a calibration, optimal PD increases welfare by about $30/person-year. I extend the model to arbitrary signal structures, behavioral consumers, a monopolized industry, and multiproduct firms.