Platform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets
研究了广告资助型平台的市场势力如何影响其设计选择，发现平台在消费者侧定价为零时会产生设计偏差，并分析了技术采纳、隐私和广告量等具体场景，为加强竞争政策提供了依据。
Abstract We investigate how platform market power affects platforms' design choices in ad‐funded two‐sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider design choices affecting both sides in opposite ways and compare private incentives with social incentives. Platforms' design biases depend crucially on whether they can charge any price on the consumer side. We apply the framework to technology adoption, privacy, and ad load choices. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb market power of ad‐funded platforms with free services.