Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts
研究了不可分割物品（如大学录取）的合同分配中，如何同时保证稳定性和学生效率，发现合同使两者冲突，并给出了实现这些性质的最弱条件。
Consider indivisible-object allocation with contracts, such as college admissions, where contracts specify majors. Can a designer guarantee a stable and (student) efficient matching? I show that contracts put stability and efficiency at odds; a necessary condition to ensure these properties is student-lexicographic priorities—schools must rank contracts from “second-tier” students consecutively. I present the weakest restriction guaranteeing stability and efficiency, and characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for any mechanism within a general class to deliver a stable and efficient matching in an incentive compatible manner. I apply this result to two well-known mechanisms: deferred acceptance and top trading cycles.