盲目披露

Blind Disclosure

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2023
被引 2
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

研究发送者基于初步私人信号决定是否披露信息的理论,发现披露存在阈值且不确定性增加会减少披露,并用大学成绩数据验证了模型。

Abstract

We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private signal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature’s canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in environments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclosure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisclosed grades in a large university, we find that the model is consistent with student choices during spring 2020 to conceal letter grades by switching to optional pass-fail grades.

盲披露部分解构风险规避道德风险