Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents
研究了代理人私下知道自身类型并试图被委托人保留的场景，发现均衡中委托人会对极端信号持怀疑态度，仅当信号落在中间有界集合时才保留代理人，即遵循“好得令人难以置信”的准则。
An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: “if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.” We consider extensions and applications, including non-normal signal structures, dynamics with term limits, risky portfolio management, and political risk-taking.