Does Shareholder Litigation Risk Cause Public Firms to Delist? Evidence from Securities Class Action Lawsuits
利用联邦法官意识形态和两个司法判例作为外部冲击，研究发现股东诉讼风险降低会减少公司从美国股市退市的倾向，部分原因在于诉讼的间接成本，而私有化能显著降低诉讼威胁。
Abstract Using three exogenous shocks to ex ante litigation risk, including federal judge ideology and two influential judicial precedents, we find that lower shareholder litigation risk reduces a firm’s propensity to delist from the U.S. stock markets. The effect is at least partially driven by indirect costs of litigation and that being a private firm can significantly reduce the threat of litigation. Overall, the results suggest that mitigating excessive litigation costs for public firms is crucial to ensure the continued vibrancy of the U.S. stock market.