Does CEO debt-like compensation mitigate corporate social irresponsibility?
研究了CEO的债务类薪酬（养老金和递延薪酬）是否减少企业社会不负责任行为，发现其与环境、社会和治理风险暴露负相关，且在财务困境风险高或CEO职业担忧大时更显著。
Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) is an increasingly relevant topic to today's business, as CSI may exert stronger impacts on firms than corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, little is known about mechanisms that can constrain such irresponsible actions. We examine whether CEO debt-like compensation (i.e. pension and deferred compensation granted to the CEO of a firm) mitigates CSI, which is proxied by environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk exposure. Using media coverage of ESG incidents as a measure, we find that ESG risk exposure is negatively related to CEO debt-like compensation. Furthermore, this relation is stronger when firms have higher distress risks or when CEOs have greater career concerns.