Go with the Politician
研究发现，企业会跟随地方官员到其新任职地区大量购买土地，且价格更低，但这种跟随行为导致土地配置效率下降，造成显著的经济扭曲。
Chinese local leaders are frequently moved across prefectures. By combining local leader rotation data and comprehensive firm land parcel purchase data across prefectures from 2006 to 2016, this paper examines how firm–politician connections affect resource allocation and finds that a firm headquartered in a leader’s previous work prefecture purchases three times more land parcels in that leader’s new governing prefecture than the prefecture-year mean, at half the unit prices. Identification is from within-firm-year variation in various prefectures through exogenous politician rotation. Land usage efficiency is lower for these follower firms’ land parcels. Land allocation distortion is also economically sizable.