On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
提出一种新方法，研究n人单奖竞赛模型中单调纯策略贝叶斯-纳什均衡的存在性，该模型涵盖完全和不完全区分竞赛，允许选手类型和出价连续、估值和成本相互依赖。
We introduce a new approach to studying the existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in an n-player single-prize contest model that covers both perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests. The contestants have continua of possible types and bids, atomless type distributions, and their valuations and costs might depend not only on their own bids and types but also on other bidders' bids and types. Many, quite different contests are covered by our generalized contest model and equilibrium existence in monotone pure strategies in them follows from this paper's results.