Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence
研究发现高税率国家的税务机关缺乏打击利润转移至避税天堂的激励，反而倾向于将执法重点放在其他高税率国家，从而挤出了对避税天堂交易的执法，减少了跨国公司的全球纳税额。
We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement.