Board Connections and Dividend Policy
研究发现董事会关联度高的公司更可能支付股利且支付更多，尤其在代理冲突严重的公司中，表明关联董事会通过股利缓解代理问题。
We examine the role of firm board connectedness in shaping a firm's dividend policy. We show that firms with well‐connected boards not only have a higher likelihood of paying dividends in the pooled sample of both dividend payers and non‐payers but also pay more dividends in the sample of dividend payers, compared with those with poorly connected boards. Further analysis reveals that the relation between board connectedness and dividend‐paying behaviour tends to be economically stronger in firms pre‐identified to have more severe agency conflicts, suggesting that well‐connected boards tend to use dividends to mitigate agency problems in these firms. These findings are robust to different measures of board connectedness, different dividend payout measures, alternative estimation methods, and tests that account for endogeneity.