Bank Influence at a Discount
在一般均衡框架下，研究发现银行可能以折扣价购买政治影响力：它们提供相对较小的竞选捐款却获得巨大影响力，从而产生异常收益。捐款对银行收益有直接成本效应和间接政策效应，两者共同决定异常收益的变化。
Abstract In a general equilibrium framework, we show that banks may “buy” political influence at a discount: They offer disproportionately small campaign contributions compared to the influence they exert, thus generating abnormal returns. We distinguish between the direct effect of contributions which, as a cost, reduce bank returns, and the indirect effect of contributions which boost returns via inducing bank-favoring policies. Therefore, abnormal returns may or may not increase with the amount of contributions, depending on which effect dominates: Stricter capital requirements decrease contributions and abnormal returns. When politicians attach more weight to households’ welfare, contributions increase and abnormal returns decrease.