Commitment and cheap talk in search deterrence
研究了卖家在阻止消费者搜索时承诺能力的作用，实验发现即使缺乏承诺，卖家的廉价谈话仍能显著影响买家决策，并通过虚假报价或未来低价来利用消费者。
Abstract We investigate the role of sellers' commitment power in discouraging consumer search. Theoretically, lack of commitment power transforms sellers' search‐deterring claims into cheap talk, eliminating sellers' ability to deter search in some market environments. However, our experiments show buyers' search decisions are significantly affected by sellers' cheap talk. When future prices are not adjustable, sellers falsely claim exploding offers to deter search. When future prices are adjustable, sellers falsely claim low future prices to lure consumers to return after search and exploit these “captive” consumers with subsequent price hikes. A behavioral model with naïve buyers explains our experimental findings.