Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank
说明独立中央银行可通过管理资产负债表和资本，承诺货币贬值和汇率盯住，从而实施最优逃离流动性陷阱的策略，即使无法承诺未来货币供给也能实现。
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg.This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation.This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply.It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.