Competing with fad products: erroneous health beliefs and market outcomes
研究错误的营养观念如何影响厂商利润和消费者剩余，以及政府信息干预能否改善福利。发现错误信念在某些条件下降低消费者剩余和总福利，信息提供通常增加总福利但可能牺牲消费者剩余。
Abstract We study how erroneous nutrition assumptions affect manufacturers’ profits and consumer surplus and how the government could intervene to improve welfare. In our model, two manufacturers produce a conventional product and a fad version misperceived to bring health benefits. We compare the laissez-faire outcome to two outcomes: one without false beliefs and the other with information provision reducing the false belief’s prevalence. We find that false beliefs about the health benefits of fad products lower consumer surplus and total welfare under some conditions. Information provision generally increases total welfare, but, in some situations, this occurs at the expense of consumer surplus.