Equilibrium Effects of Food Labeling Policies
研究智利强制食品标签政策，发现消费者从被标签产品转向未标签产品，企业调整配方集中在阈值附近；模型估计标签使消费者福利增加1.8%，且企业反应增强效果；与糖税相比，标签更有利于穷人。
We study a regulation in Chile that mandates warning labels on products whose sugar or caloric concentration exceeds certain thresholds. We show that consumers substitute from labeled to unlabeled products—a pattern mostly driven by products that consumers mistakenly believe to be healthy. On the supply side, we find substantial reformulation of products and bunching at the thresholds. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of demand for food and firms' pricing and nutritional choices. We find that food labels increase consumer welfare by 1.8% of total expenditure, and that these effects are enhanced by firms' responses. We then use the model to study alternative policy designs. Under optimal policy thresholds, food labels and sugar taxes generate similar gains in consumer welfare, but food labels benefit the poor relatively more.