Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information
研究了当任务水平差异化且边际成本比较优势不同时，信息不对称如何影响制造商与供应商之间的任务分配，发现制造商根据自身效率水平会过度外包给通用型供应商或不足外包给专业型供应商。
We explore how asymmetric information affects task assignment between a manufacturer and its supplier when tasks are horizontally differentiated, and when the comparative advantage in terms of marginal costs differs during the production process. We show that the manufacturer over-outsources to a generalist supplier and under-outsources to a specialist supplier depending on its level of efficiency. The presence of countervailing incentives drives these results. When the manufacturer’s internal costs are sufficiently low, it can externalize some of its best tasks and internalize its worst tasks. These two distortions simultaneously affect the contract offered to the generalist supplier.