Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig Workers
通过实地实验（n=944）研究捐赠激励对在线零工工人劳动供给的影响，发现统一性捐赠目的比极化性捐赠目的更能吸引工人并提高生产率。
Abstract This study examines the effects of donation incentives on labor supply in an online labor market through a field experiment ( n = 944). We manipulate the donation purpose of the incentive to be either unifying or polarizing and the size of the donation relative to the workers’ wage. Our experimental design allows us to observe the decision to accept a job (extensive margin) and different dimensions of productivity (intensive margin). We predict and show that a unifying donation purpose attracts more gig workers and improves their productivity compared to a polarizing donation purpose. We discuss the implications of these results in order to understand the role of donation incentives and labor supply in online labor markets.