Private Renegotiations and Government Interventions in Credit Chains
研究了企业通过负债相互连接的信用链中，私人重新谈判的激励机制及政府干预如何影响债务减免和补贴政策，对应对疫情和金融危机有参考价值。
Abstract We propose a model of strategic renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a credit chain, gives rise to externalities, as each lender’s willingness to provide concessions to its borrower depends on how this lender’s own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. We highlight how government interventions aimed at preventing default waves should account for private renegotiation incentives and interlinkages. In particular, we contrast the consequences of targeted subsidy and debt reduction programs following economic shocks, such as pandemics and financial crises.