Shareholder litigation and short selling ahead of private equity placements
研究发现，在私募配售（PIPE）前，曾遭遇证券集体诉讼的发行公司会被更大量地卖空；诉讼状态、严重程度及配售时间影响卖空程度，且当领投方为对冲基金时效应更显著。
Abstract We examine the impact of shareholder litigation on short selling ahead of private investments in public equity (PIPEs). We find that PIPE issuers that incurred securities class action lawsuits prior to the PIPE are shorted more heavily ahead of the PIPE issue. The case status at the PIPE date, the severity of the lawsuit, and the timing of the private placement after the litigation event also affect the extent of short selling activity ahead of PIPEs. Consistent with hedging incentives, the effects of prior shareholder litigation on short selling are more pronounced in PIPEs where lead investors are hedge funds and in traditional PIPEs.