CEO career concerns in early tenure and corporate social responsibility reporting
研究发现CEO在任期初期因职业担忧，会通过自愿发布企业社会责任报告来传递信号，尤其在信息中介较强的公司中更明显，且早期报告能带来更高薪酬、更好声誉和更低离职率。
Abstract The literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure focuses on its economic consequences, but little is known about motivations—especially CEO personal incentives—behind such disclosure. Using an array of CSR reporting measures, we find that career concerns of CEOs early in their tenure motivate them to use voluntary CSR reporting as a signaling mechanism. The negative association between CEO tenure and CSR reporting is more pronounced in firms with stronger information intermediaries—that is, a higher level of socially responsible investors, a higher number of analysts following, and a higher level of media coverage. We also find that CEOs early in their tenure receive more personal benefits after voluntary CSR reporting, in terms of higher total compensation, better reputation, and less turnover, than CEOs later in their tenure. Taken together, the findings of our study lend support to the conjecture that CEO career concerns early in their tenure can be an important determinant of firms' voluntary CSR reporting.