When Homemakers Are Compensated: The Effect of Homemaking Provisions on Spousal Time Allocation
研究了婚姻财产法中承认家务劳动贡献的条款如何影响配偶的时间分配，发现该条款在单方离婚制度下会促使妻子增加家务劳动、减少市场劳动。
Many argue that the liberalization of divorce laws reduced the commitment value of marriage and thus discouraged the division of labor in a household. I examine how homemaking provisions in marital property law that recognize the contribution of homemakers in the division of marital properties at divorce affects spousal time allocation. Conceivably, such laws could increase the gendered division of labor in a household. I develop a noncooperative household model to analyze the effects of such provisions on spousal time allocation. The empirical findings provide support for the noncooperative household model, particularly under unilateral divorce regimes in which it is difficult for partners to make long-term commitments to each other. The results show that a unilateral divorce regime with a homemaking provision is associated with wives increasing their housework and reducing their market labor. Married women should be legally protected when they fulfill the worthy role of homemaker and mother so that their financial dependency does not lead them to disaster. Laws should be enacted which give the wife an equal interest in the marital property. (Maxwell 1976, p. 15)