Social networks and managerial rent‐seeking: Evidence from executive trading profitability
研究发现，董事会社会网络越强，高管交易盈利越低，表明社会网络能抑制管理层利用私有信息寻租，对关注董事会作用的监管者有政策启示。
Abstract This study examines whether board social networks are associated with executive trading profitability. Using a sample of US public firms with a history of executive trading from years 2000 to 2015, we find robust evidence that the profitability of executive trading is significantly lower in firms with higher levels of board social networks. The evidence is consistent with our view that board social networks effectively curb executives' private information advantage over outsiders, thus leading to a lower level of managerial rent‐seeking. Our research has policy implications for regulators concerned about the role of corporate board in capital markets.