Drought‐Reliefs and Partisanship
结合理论模型和断点回归设计，研究巴西干旱救济分配中的党派偏见，发现党派偏见仅在市政选举前出现，且对中等干旱程度地区影响最大。
Abstract We combine a model of symmetric information with selfish and office‐motivated politicians and a Regression Discontinuity Design analysis based on close municipal elections to study partisan bias in the allocation of drought aid relief in Brazil. We identify a novel pattern of distributive politics whereby partisan bias materialises only before municipal elections, while it disappears before presidential elections. Furthermore, before mayoral elections, it fades for extreme (high or low) aridity levels while persisting for moderate levels. Our empirical results show that in this case alignment increases the probability of receiving aid relief by a factor of two (equivalent to 18.1 percentage points).