Paying for randomization and indecisiveness
通过最后通牒博弈实验，研究人们在面对物质收益与公平的冲突偏好时是否愿意为随机化选择付费，发现多数人会主动随机化并愿意为此付费，表明随机化可能改善个人福利。
Abstract We examine preference for randomization, and link it to conflicting preference-led indecisiveness in social settings. In an ultimatum game experiment where receivers may face conflicting preferences between material gains and equity, we allow receivers to assign non-zero probabilities to both acceptance and rejection (the randomized choice) in addition to the standard binary choice of acceptance or rejection. We further elicit receivers’ willingness to pay for using the randomized choice instead of the binary choice. We find that a theoretical model incorporating receivers’ conflicting preferences explains the experimental results well: most receivers randomized actively between acceptance and rejection, and many were willing to pay for randomization. Our results suggest that allowing people to randomize when making choices with conflicting preferences may improve individual welfare.