Pressures From Media Coverage: Evidence on Managing Earnings Toward Earnings Guidance
研究发现媒体关注会迫使管理者操纵盈余以减少预测误差，这种效应主要由媒体的信息传播而非信息创造驱动，且在诉讼风险高、管理者声誉顾虑大或治理薄弱时更显著。
This study investigates whether media attention pressures managers to live up to market expectations. Using a comprehensive dataset of media coverage on U.S. public firms, we find that media coverage pressures, rather than deters, managers to manipulate reported earnings to reduce management forecast errors, and the effect is mainly driven by the media’s information dissemination role rather than its information creation role. In addition, we show that the association is stronger when firms face higher litigation risk, when managers have higher reputational concerns, and when corporate governance is weaker. Our findings provide new insights into a potentially negative effect of media coverage in the capital markets.