ES Risks and Shareholder Voice
研究了股东对环境与社会提案的投票是否揭示公司面临的环境与社会风险，发现即使提案失败，高支持率也能预测后续风险事件及其对股东价值的影响。
Abstract We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online