Comparative advantage with many goods: New treatment and results
本文首次将Shapley-Shubik市场博弈机制扩展到连续商品情形，建立寡头竞争模型，证明当代理人策略行事时，贸易由战略决策而非比较优势驱动。
This paper constitutes the very first treatment of the Shapley–Shubik (1977) market-game mechanism with a continuum of commodities. We develop an oligopolistic-competition model in which product prices are endogenously determined, via buyers’ and sellers’ strategic decisions, and we lay down and examine its mathematical structure. Taking agents’ market power into account, we restudy the Ricardian Law of Comparative Advantage in a many-commodity framework, and obtain a (new) result that is in line with what is perceived in real-world markets: when agents act strategically, they do not specialise based on comparative advantages. For a large class of utility functions, we prove the existence of equilibria at all of which trade is driven neither by absolute nor comparative advantages, but exclusively by strategic decision-making.