Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns
针对低成本投标人同时是低质量供应商的逆向选择问题，提出LoLA机制（低价彩票拍卖），在激励相容条件下最大化买方和社会剩余，并通过意大利政府拍卖的反事实分析量化其相对于第一价格拍卖的收益。
Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a counterfactual analysis of Italian government auctions, we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal procurement mechanism (a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction (the adopted format).