The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle
研究发现，在共同概率拍卖中，被试的出价行为符合纳什均衡，与共同价值拍卖中的过度出价形成对比，并指出差异源于价值估计方式而非出价策略。
This paper presents a puzzle in the behavior of experimental subjects in what we call common-probability auctions. In common-value auctions, uncertainty is defined over values, while in common-probability auctions, uncertainty is defined over probabilities. We find that in contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions, bidding in strategically equivalent common-probability auctions is consistent with Nash equilibrium. To explain our results, we run treatments to identify whether this difference stems from the way subjects estimate the good’s value in a competitive environment rather than the way they bid conditional on these valuations. We conclude it is the former.