LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS
研究了垄断保险市场中消费者可获取有成本的风险类型证据时，允许保险公司依据证据订立合同对消费者福利的影响，并与完全竞争情形对比，发现证据成本较低时合同证据总能实现帕累托改进。
Abstract I analyze a model of monopoly insurance contracting where the consumer has access to endogenous, costly evidence of his risk type. I characterize when the consumer is worse off if the insurer is allowed to condition contracts on evidence and when the ability to contract on evidence leads to a Pareto improvement. I compare the results to an analogous setting with perfect competition: Under perfect competition, when evidence acquisition costs are low, the ability to contract on evidence is always Pareto improving. For intermediate costs, I uncover a new source of unraveling.