Divide and choose: An informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems
提出一种简单通用的策略方法分析破产问题，构造三个谈判博弈，其子博弈完美均衡分别对应三种经典分配规则，并讨论了不完全信息下的稳健性。
This paper proposes a simple and general strategic approach for analyzing bankruptcy problems. We construct three strategic bargaining games and show that they yield unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes that coincide with the allocations given by the three prominent solution concepts, the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the Talmud rule, respectively. We also discuss the robustness of the result in the presence of certain incomplete information. The approach can be readily extended to study alternative solutions for bankruptcy problems or other settings such as surplus sharing problems, and is further enriched by considering a voting stage. Central to all these bargaining protocols is an extended and context-fitting “divide-and-choose” mechanism.