Friendly Investing and Information Sharing in the Asset Management Industry
研究了资产管理公司是否通过友好投资获取内幕信息，发现共同基金超配关联金融集团股票并在投票中支持管理层，且业绩因交易关联方借款公司股票而提升。
Abstract Do asset managers engage in friendly investing to obtain privileged investment information? We test this hypothesis in the context of mutual fund connections to financial groups. Using brokers as the source of connections, we find that funds overweight the stock of connected financial groups and side with management in contested votes. We also find that fund performance improves with the extent of friendly investing. The improvement stems from trading the stock of companies that borrow from connected financial groups. Brokerage commissions do not drive the results. Our findings suggest that funds can obtain valuable information by acting as friendly shareholders.