Too-big-to-fail in federations?
研究了不同人口规模的地区提供具有正溢出效应的地方公共品时，匹配补助金虽能诱导最优支出，但地区可能利用这一机制寻求救助。模型证明了“太大而不能倒”和“太小而不能倒”结果的存在条件。
We consider jurisdictions of different population size that provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants can induce optimal expenditure levels, but the regions can exploit the rationale behind this system to induce bailouts. We formalize the too-big-to-fail result of Wildasin (1997) by proving that it exists in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which the central government’s decisions are taken by regional representatives. Furthermore, our model contains the too-big-to-fail and too-small-to-fail outcomes as special cases, and we are the first to derive the conditions under which each result emerges.