Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding and Auction Design
研究了FDIC在解决破产银行时，评分规则不确定性如何导致投标者提交多重投标，并量化了消除这种不确定性可降低29.8%至44.6%的解决成本，对银行监管和拍卖设计有参考价值。
Abstract The FDIC resolves insolvent banks with scoring auctions. Although the structure of the scoring rule is known to bidders, they are uncertain about how the FDIC trades off different bid components. Scoring-rule uncertainty motivates bidders to submit multiple bids for the same failed bank. To evaluate the effects of uncertainty and multiple bidding for FDIC costs, we develop a methodology for analysing multidimensional bidding when the auctioneer’s scoring weights are unknown to bidders. We estimate private valuations for failed-bank assets during the great financial crisis and compute counterfactuals in the absence of scoring uncertainty. Our findings imply a substantial reduction in FDIC resolution costs of between 29.8% ($8.2 billion) and 44.6% ($12.3 billion). These savings can reduce policy-driven banking-sector distortions, since FDIC resolution costs are covered either through special levies on banks or through loans from the US Treasury. Our analyses also shed new light on optimal bid portfolio choice in combinatorial auctions.