Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents
研究了标准必要专利许可市场中的摩擦如何导致潜在被许可方策略性延迟许可以规避或减少专利费，基于2010-2019年美国诉讼数据构建了诉讼前和诉讼中的劫持指标。
The theory of patent “hold-out” posits that frictions in the market for licensing standard-essential patents (SEPs) provide incentives for prospective licensees to opportunistically delay taking licenses with the goal of avoiding or reducing royalty payments. We construct measures of pre- and in-litigation hold-out from information disclosed in U.S. cases filed 2010–2019. Relying on both SEP and a matched control set of non-SEP disputes, we explore whether frictions in the market for licensing are associated with hold-out. We find some evidence of an association between hold-out and both SEP portfolio size and enforcement uncertainty; however, we find no evidence associating pre- or in-litigation hold-out with the international breadth of SEP rights.