Political regimes and firms' decisions to pay bribes: theory and evidence from firm-level surveys
利用世界银行企业调查数据，研究税务检查次数如何影响企业行贿倾向，发现检查越多企业越可能行贿，尤其在非民主国家更明显。
Abstract This paper makes the most of the observed actions of bribe takers and givers from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and studies how a taker's action influences a giver's decision to pay bribes. To motivate our empirical study, we consider Kaufmann and Wei's (1999) Stackelberg game between a tax authority and a firm that undergoes tax inspection. The model predicts that, when the authority can use its action as a credible threat for the firm's profitability, the authority disturbs the firm by inspecting more, and the firm is more likely to pay bribes. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we find correlational evidence that the propensity to pay bribes increases with the number of inspection visits, particularly for non-democratic countries.