In the CEO We Trust: Negative Effects of Trust Between the Board and the CEO
研究发现董事会与CEO之间的高度信任反而导致并购业绩变差，表现为公告回报、长期股价和运营表现下滑，尤其在代理问题严重的公司中更明显。
Abstract In this study, we investigate whether and how trust between board members and the CEO (board–CEO trust) affects the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that firms with higher levels of board–CEO trust exhibit poor M&A performance. High trust is associated with low acquisition announcement returns, long-term stock return performance, and post-deal operating performance. This negative effect of board–CEO trust is more pronounced among acquiring companies prone to agency problems. Our results suggest that, in the institutional setting of corporate boards, high trust can be too much of a good thing.