What does the evidence tell us about merit principles and government performance?
本文系统回顾了关于功绩制（如择优录用、任期保护）对政府绩效和腐败影响的实证研究，发现这些做法与更高绩效和更低腐败显著相关，对公共政策和管理有启示。
Abstract In October 2020, President Donald Trump sought to convert many US federal civil servants to at‐will employees by executive order. Trump's initiative, referred to as Schedule F, has stimulated a partisan debate about dismantling the merit system in the US federal government. A substantial international body of evidence has developed during the last three decades about the effects of administrative practices associated with meritocracy and the likely consequences of changes to civil service systems, such as those embedded in Schedule F. This article employs guidelines established under the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta‐Analyses (PRISMA) to conduct a systematic review of the evidence to address the question: What does the evidence tell us about merit principles and government performance? This systematic review summarizes what empirical research tells us about effects of civil service practices, such as meritocratic appointments, meritocratic advancement, and tenure protection, for government performance and the quality of government. The findings indicate that factors such as meritocratic appointments/recruitment, tenure protection, impartiality, and professionalism are strongly associated with higher government performance and lower corruption. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for public policy and management and for future research.