Does corporate diversification retrench the effects of firm‐level political risk?
研究了企业层面政治风险对公司投资的影响，发现多元化公司比专注型公司更能通过内部资本市场缓解政治风险对投资的负面作用，且这种缓解并非通过政治游说或捐赠实现。
Abstract This study investigates the effects of firm‐level political risk on corporate investments. We find that diversified firms are better able than focused firms in mitigating the impact of idiosyncratic political risk on investments. Diversified firms accomplish this feat via efficient use of the internal capital market that allows segments to alleviate political risk adversity. The effect is working through the channel of exacerbation of financial constraints. When exposed to political risk, diversified firms do not spend more on lobbying and political donations than the focused firms in the subsequent period, implying that diversified firms do not manage political risk politically. Our main findings are robust to a battery of endogeneity tests.