Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China
通过大规模实地实验，发现中国私营企业普遍不喜欢有政府背景的投资者，尤其是业绩最好的企业，原因主要是担心政治干预决策，这揭示了国家资本主义模式的局限性。
We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decision-making is the leading reason why government investors are unattractive to private firms. Overall, our findings point to the limits of a model of “state capitalism” that strongly relies on the complementarity between private firms and government capital to drive high-growth entrepreneurship and innovation.