Insurance Rate Regulation, Management of the Loss Reserve and Pricing
研究发现，在费率监管更严格的州，保险公司会低估损失准备金，以应对监管压力；而监管允许的卡特尔式集体定价导致保费高于竞争水平，会计操纵被用来为偏离高价提供理由。
ABSTRACT Insurance pricing is subject to stricter regulation in some states than others. This cross-sectional variation, coupled with the occurrence of staggered deregulation in several states, enables a powerful test of the political cost hypothesis that managers manipulate accruals to mitigate adverse effects of rate regulation. We show that insurers understate their loss reserve accruals in more regulated regimes, a finding that contrasts with most prior studies documenting expense-increasing accruals in regulatory pricing settings like utilities. We theorize and find evidence that regulator-enabled cartel-like collective rate making leads to premiums being higher than the competitive level. Our results are consistent with accounting manipulation being used to justify deviating from these high rates and showcase a role for accounting in cartel enforcement. JEL Classifications: M41; G18; G22; G32.