Partitioned Pricing and Collusion on Surcharges
研究双寡头市场中企业将产品价格拆分为基础价和强制附加费的分拆定价策略，发现分拆定价比统一定价带来更高价格和利润，且仅协调附加费就能实现与统一定价合谋同等的利润。
Abstract Partitioned pricing is a pricing practice that divides the price of a product into a base price and one or more mandatory surcharges. This paper develops a theory of partitioned pricing using a duopoly model where the owner of each firm determines the surcharge, but delegates the setting of the base price to a manager. In equilibrium, both firms choose partitioned pricing over the conventional all-inclusive pricing. Moreover, partitioned pricing leads to higher full prices and larger profits than all-inclusive pricing. Most surprisingly, collusion on surcharges without any coordination on base prices is as profitable as collusion on all-inclusive prices.