Committee-Based Blockchains as Games between Opportunistic Players and Adversaries
研究了权益证明区块链中委员会共识的博弈模型，发现当惩罚有限时，搭便车和道德风险会导致无效区块，并提出了一个能产生有效区块的协议改进方案。
Abstract We study consensus in a protocol capturing in a simplified manner the major features of the majority of Proof of Stake blockchains. A committee is formed; one member proposes a block; and the others can check its validity and vote for it. Blocks with a majority of votes are produced. When an invalid block is produced, the stakes of the members who voted for it are “slashed.” Profit-maximizing members interact with adversaries seeking to disrupt consensus. When slashing is limited, free-riding and moral-hazard lead to invalid blocks in equilibrium. We propose a protocol modification producing only valid blocks in equilibrium. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.