Adverse selection in the group life insurance market
利用一所大型大学的薪资和医疗理赔数据，研究发现健康状况较差的员工更倾向于选择补充雇主赞助寿险，导致逆向选择，但员工在重病后通常不会增加保额，且需求对价格不敏感，逆向选择导致的保费上升不会造成显著福利损失。
Abstract The employer‐sponsored life insurance (ESLI) market is susceptible to adverse selection due to community‐rated premiums, guaranteed issue coverage, and the existence of an individual market. Using payroll and healthcare claims data from a large university, we find that employees with worse health are more likely to elect coverage causing adverse selection in supplemental ESLI. Nonetheless, we find employees typically do not increase coverage following a severe illness even when they can without providing evidence of insurability. Furthermore, demand estimation shows employees are not price‐sensitive and estimated increases in premiums from adverse selection are unlikely to cause significant welfare loss.