Mandatory Financial Disclosure and M&A Activity
利用2003年欧盟财务报告指令的实施，研究发现强制性财务披露显著增加了私营企业成为并购目标的数量和交易量，通过减少信息摩擦促进并购活动。
Abstract Taking advantage of the implementation of the 2003 European Commission (EC) directive on financial reporting, we explore the impact of mandatory financial disclosure on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We find robust evidence that the number (and volume) of private firms becoming an M&A target increases with mandatory disclosure. Analyses of cross-industry differences, deal-level data, and post-deal performance indicate that financial disclosure increases M&A activity by reducing information frictions in the market for corporate control. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online